The American Public and Roosevelt's Peace Appeal 
 The Charge' d'Affaires in the United States to the Foreign Ministry - on the Reaction of American Press and Public to President Roosevelt's Peace Appeal 
 Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy , series D, vol. VI, p.297. No. 757 WASHINGTON, D.C. April 20, 1939 Pol. IX 969. Received May 3. 
 Subject: Reception of Roosevelt's so-called Peace Appeal by the American Press and Public Opinion. With reference to my telegram No. 121 of April 17. The so-called peace appeal, which President Roosevelt addressed to the Fuehrer and Chancellor and to the Duce on the 15th of this month, has been received by the American press and public opinion with general approval. This of course applies particularly to Roosevelt's adherents who welcome this step as an opportune attempt by the President to assume the leadership of the anti-totalitarian front, and thereby to support the efforts of the Western Powers to encircle the "dictatorships", and to stem their expansion. These circles see in the appeal the expression of Roosevelt's consistent attitude, which, from the well-known Chicago speech in October 1937, in which he spoke of the quarantine of aggressor nations, to this latest step, presents a uniform policy. For what Roosevelt is doing by this new move is to compel the leading statesmen of Germany and Italy to show their hand and clearly state their aims. But also the President's opponents, who have in recent weeks criticised with increasing violence his active foreign policy and, above all, his constant assaults on Germany and Italy, have, in the main, passed approving comment on this appeal, even if not exactly with enthusiasm. In the opposition circles of Congress there has been practically no word of criticism. The reason is first and foremost that the American, who as a rule still has something of Wilson's missionary ideas in him, is easily roused to enthusiasm over such dulcet tones of peace, and that even the most violent opposition can only escape from them with difficulty. Even though the President was passionately condemned for his continual war flourishes, it seemed contradictory, to say the least, to censure him for this step which, on superficial examination, appeared to spring from peaceful intentions. In spite of this, there has been no lack of voices gravely doubting the President's right to make such an appeal, since Roosevelt has abused the totalitarian Powers too long and too often to play the role of a peace-loving and neutral mediator successfully at this late date. Interesting in this connection is a leading article in the New Yorker Staatszeitung of April 17, which proves quite clearly that Roosevelt has no such right. On the other hand, in consequence of the justifiably sharp attacks in the Italian and German press, the Opposition probably did not themselves feel quite free to criticise the President, for fear of being exposed to the reproach of lacking patriotism. The Opposition discerns that the President's step was undertaken under strong pressure of consideration of domestic policy. It is felt that Roosevelt wished to appear before the country with the halo of a world peace mission, firstly to strengthen his prestige - which owing to the failure of the New Deal, has declined considerably - but, above all, to take the wind out of the sails of those who had accused him, not without effect on public opinion, of having aggressive and war-mongering aims. By this step Roosevelt has, in fact, succeeded in temporarily silencing his opponents. In both camps opinions vary as to what may have caused Roosevelt to take this surprising step. Some believe that the President spontaneously decided on this demarche because of the increasingly pessimistic reports of Bullitt in Paris and Kennedy in London. Others are of the opinion that the plan to take this step had already been conceived at warm Springs, and that the message had been well considered and thought out long before. The President, in answering a question at his Press Conference, merely stated that the plan had not sprung from someone else's initiative, but was exclusively his own idea. There is general agreement that no illusions should be entertained as to the answer. An affirmative answer is, from the way the question was phrased, hardly to be expected. Also, it would be difficult to imagine a guarantee, which would embrace so vast an area as the territories of the 31 States specified. A section of the press represents the point of view that it is of no account whether the "dictatorships" answer in the affirmative or the negative. An affirmative answer would not substantially alter the state of affairs, as no confidence should be placed in a promise given by the totalitarian Powers. A negative answer would have the advantage of clarifying the position. Thus war guilt would be unequivocally established before the outbreak of a conflict. There was general surprise when it was learnt on the 17th that the Fuehrer had summoned the Reichstag and would answer Roosevelt's demarche in detail. From this it is thought that one can conclude that the German answer will not be a blank refusal, but rather a detailed presentation, furnished with counter demands, of the German point of view. The order given to the fleet on the 15th to withdraw immediately from Atlantic waters, where it had been preparing for a review for the opening of the New York World Fair, and to return to its bases in the Pacific also caused surprise, and has been appraised by the press as supplementing the peace appeal. This measure will, it is thought, besides securing American interests, above all relieve Britain and France, whose Fleets are tied up in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and will thus re-establish strategic equilibrium between the democracies and the totalitarian Powers. A collection of leading articles and correspondents' reports is enclosed. 
 THOMSEN